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Abstract 
 
If producers have more information than consumers about goods’ attributes, then they 
may use non-price (rather than price) adjustment mechanisms and, consequently, the 
market may reach a new equilibrium even if prices remain sticky. We study a situation 
where producers adjust the quantity (per package) rather than the price in response to 
changes in market conditions. Although consumers should be indifferent between 
equivalent changes in goods' prices and quantities, empirical evidence suggests that 
consumers often respond differently to price changes and equivalent quantity changes. 
We offer a possible explanation for this puzzle by constructing and empirically testing a 
model in which consumers incur cognitive costs when processing goods’ price and 
quantity information. The model is based on evidence from cognitive psychology and 
explains consumers’ decision whether or not to process goods’ price and quantity 
information. Our findings explain why producers sometimes adjust goods’ prices and 
sometimes goods’ quantities. In addition, they predict variability in price adjustment 
costs over time and across economic conditions.  
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NEW YORK (CNN) -- When was the last time you carefully checked how much food is in the package? For example, a 
bag of Tostitos costs $3.29 in New York, as it has for years. But look at the weight: 13 1/2 ounces now, when it used to 
contain a full ounce more. The lower weight surprised one shopper: "It makes me very angry," she said. "You're paying 
the same price, but getting less for your money."                                                                   
Frank Buckley, CNN Correspondent, January 16, 20011 
 
1. Introduction 
While the economics literature considers the price system to be the focal 
mechanism for efficient allocation, price is just one of several product attributes. Other 
attributes include quantity (i.e., package size), quality, delivery place, delivery time, etc. 
As Carlton (1983, 1989), Blinder, et al. (1998), and Rosen (1974) argue, any of these 
attributes may change in response to changes in market conditions. For example, Carlton 
(1977, 1991) studies environments where delivery time and quality serve as the margin 
along which the adjustment takes place.  
In this paper we consider the product quantity as an alternative margin of choice 
for adjustment. There is ample anecdotic evidence on quantity adjustment. For example, 
food manufacturers often downsize their product contents while their prices remain 
sticky.2 Manufacturers also offer "value packs," larger packages for the same price. Both 
types of quantity adjustment, downsizing and upsizing, could be replaced by equivalent 
changes in prices. The main question we ask in this paper is, when is it optimal to adjust 
the price and when is it optimal to adjust the quantity. 
Swan’s (1970) theorem predicts that consumers should be indifferent between 
price and quantity changes as long as the unit prices are the same.3 However, empirical 
evidence suggests that consumers often respond differently to equivalent changes in 
prices and quantities. For example, Gourville and Kohler (2004) find that consumers are 
more likely to respond to price increases than to quantity decreases. At the same time, 
anecdotic evidence suggests that consumers responding to quantity decreases often 
reduce their demand by more than they reduce it in response to an equivalent price 
                                                 
.http://premium.europe.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/01/16/grocery.items/index.htmlSource:  1 
2
 NY Times reported that "Aiming to offset increased ingredient and transportation costs, some of the nation’s food 
manufacturers are reducing the size of packages. The price, of course, usually stays the same." According to a survey 
the article cites, 71 percent of the consumers believe that the main reason for product downsizing is to hide price 
increases. Amongst downsized products are Edy's ice cream, Dreyer's ice cream, Pampers diapers, Apple Jacks, 
Wheaties, Rice Krispies, Cocoa Krispies, Frosted Flakes, Cheerios, Corn Pops, Froot Loops, Doritos, Hellmann's 
Mayonnaise, Country Crock spread, Dial soap, Bounty paper towels, Dannon yogurt, Skippy peanut butter, Hershey’s 
Special Dark chocolate bar, Iams cat food, Tropicana orange juice, Nabisco Chips Ahoy cookies, etc. Downsizing has 
been reported in other countries as well, including Canada, Israel, New Zealand, Oman, etc. Source: 
. Many consumer advocates www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/business/14feed.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin
.http://incredibleshrinkinggroceries.comupdate the list of shrinking products. See, for example,  
3
 We use the term quantity to refer to goods’ quantity per package . For example, the quantity of a Coca-Cola bottle is 
0.5 litters in Europe and 20 fl oz in the US. 
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increase.4,5 Price and quantity adjustments, therefore, might have different long run 
effects on demand (Blinder et al., 1998, Rotemberg, 2005).  
In this paper, we construct, calibrate, and test a model which offers a possible 
explanation for consumers’ behavior. In the model, consumers face cognitive costs of 
information processing and therefore, they must determine how attentive they are by 
deciding whether to process goods’ price information, quantity information, both or 
neither (Navon and Gopher, 1979, Smith et al., 2003).6 The model predicts that producers 
are more likely to decrease quantities than increase prices if consumers are price attentive 
while they are more likely to increase quantities than to reduce prices if consumers are 
quantity attentive. We find that in general, consumers are more likely to process goods’ 
price information than quantity information. They are more likely to process both goods’ 
price and quantity information when markets are competitive. The model and the 
estimation results also suggest that consumers’ knowledge of price and quantity 
information might vary across goods and over the cycle. 
We test the model’s predictions using data from two surveys on consumers' 
knowledge of goods’ prices and quantities. We find that consumers are more likely to 
recall goods’ quantity during holidays than during other times. We also find evidence that 
consumers’ characteristics and goods’ attributes often affect the likelihood of recalling 
goods’ prices and quantities. For example, consumers with large families are more likely 
to recall goods’ prices and quantities. They are also more likely to recall goods’ prices if 
price variance in the category is large and if the goods’ are sold in multi-unit packs. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss cognitive costs of 
information processing and their implications for attention. In section 3, we construct the 
model.  In section 4, we calibrate the model and conduct comparative static experiments. 
In section 5, we describe the data. In section 6 we test the model’s predictions and report 
the estimation results. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                 
4
 For example, one consumer who learned that an ice cream producer decreased the size of its products responded by: 
“Thanks goodness. This will give me a reason to stop buying ice cream.” See:  
www.mouseprint.org/2008/05/12/ice-cream-scoop-major-brands-downsize-again/. See also 
www.movetonz.org/forum/whats-news/9724-buyers-disgusted-product-downsizing-tactics.html. 
5
 Producers seem to respond to this asymmetry in consumers’ behavior by strategic use of quantity adjustment instead 
of price adjustment because in some settings a quantity change may be more profitable than an equivalent price change. 
For example, Hershey changed the quantity of its bars 15 times during the inflationary period of the 1970s and 1980s 
but changed the price only 4 times (Knotek, 2011).. 
6
 The notion of inattentive behavior that we study here is related to a similar notion studied, for example, in Mankiw 
and Reis (2002, 2007, 2010), Ball, et al. (2005), Reis (2006a, 2006b, 2009), Klenow and Willis (2007), Knotek (2010), 
and Ehrmann (2011), to rationally inattentive behavior as in Sims (2003), to absent minded behavior as in Ameriks, et 
al. (2004), and to the notion of imperfect memory used by some game theorists. Our implementation of the notion, 
however, differs from the above. 
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2. Information Processing Costs 
Findings by cognitive psychologists suggest that performing cognitive tasks 
requires attention, which is a resource that the brain has in limited capacity (Navon and 
Gopher, 1979, Kahneman and Treisman, 1984). The amount of attention given to a task 
depends on its type and priority. High priority tasks and tasks that require large amount of 
cognitive effort usually receive more attention than routine or automatic tasks. Tasks 
which cannot receive attention at a given moment are cued until more attention is 
available. 
Processing goods’ price and quantity information costs time and effort, because it 
requires a performance of many subtasks, and each of these subtasks requires attention. 
For example, to process a good’s price information, consumers have to locate the relevant 
price-tag, code it in visual memory, process it in working memory and finally, store it in 
long-term memory. These steps are repeated for every piece of information processed. 
While these subtasks are performed, other tasks and subtasks that require attention are 
cued. The time dedicated to processing goods' price and quantity information increases, 
therefore, linearly (or almost linearly) with the number of information pieces processed. 
Thus, to minimize processing costs, consumers might choose not to process some goods’ 
price and quantity information (Thaler 2000, Levy, et al. 2011). 
 Following these insights, we construct a model in which consumers face 
cognitive costs of processing information and assess the cost and the benefits when 
deciding which information to process. Thus, in our model, processing goods’ price and 
quantity information is costly and consumers choose whether to process goods’ price 
information, quantity information, both, or neither. 
 
3. The Model 
(i) Consumers 
All consumers are identical and there is a continuum of goods indexed by 
)1,0(i . Goods are sold in packages, and each consumer purchases  iC  packages of 
good )1,0(i . Each package of good i  contains  iQ  units, which we denote as the 
quantity (i.e., the package size) of good i . Consumers therefore consume    iQiC  units 
of good i.   
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Each consumer is endowed with one unit of time which he uses for labor, leisure 
and processing goods’ information. We denote the time consumers devote to processing 
goods’ information by  1,0 , the time they devote to labor by   1,0N  and the 
time they devote to leisure by  NL  1,0 . We denote their nominal wage by W. 
Thus, their nominal income, Y, is given by NWY  . 
Following Galí (2008, p. 41) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 376), we 
assume that goods are imperfect substitutes, and that the utility function is: 
 1 1 1( , , ) , 0,1 , 0
1 1 1
C NU C N
  
   
                     (1) 
where C  is a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator defined by 
   
1 11
0
.C C i Q i di

 

         
                (2) 
In this specification,    is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption, 0  is the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to labor and with 
respect to the time devoted to processing goods’ information, and 1   is the elasticity of 
substitution between goods.  
 
(ii) Producers 
We focus on consumers’ behavior and, therefore, we follow Reis (2006a) and 
Falkinger (2008) in assuming that producers’ price setting decisions are driven by 
exogenous shocks to their marginal costs.  
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers )1,0(i . Each 
producer produces a single good, such that producer i  produces good i . Producers face 
constant marginal costs.  The marginal cost of producer  is ( )i , with  ( ) .E i    
Given consumers’ utility function (1) and the elasticity of substitution between 
goods  ,  the producers set their prices to equal the marginal costs times the desired 
markup (Galí, 2008, p. 44). Denoting the price of good  by )(iP , the desired markup, 
1

, by  , and the expected price by  )(iPEPe  , we have:  
   P i i , and                (3) 
eP  .                 (4) 
i
i
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We assume that proportion  1,01   of the producers face marginal costs equal to the 
expected cost, .  
 The rest, proportion  1,0  of the producers, face marginal cost shocks )(i . 
Their marginal costs are therefore ( ) ( )i i    .
 
We assume that the marginal cost 
shocks follow a symmetric, i.i.d. distribution with mean 0 and constant variance. We also 
assume that  ( )i    0,1i  , to ensure that the marginal costs of all producers are 
positive.  
A proportion    ,0P of the producers who face cost shocks adjust their 
prices. The price that these producers set is given by  
     P i i i      .               (5) 
The rest of the producers who experience cost shocks, proportion PQ   , 
respond by adjusting their quantities.7 Denoting the expected quantity as   iQEQe  , 
these producers adjust their quantities to  
    eQiiQ  ,                (5’) 
where )(i  is the proportion of the expected quantity that solves: 
( )
.( )e e
P i P
Q i Q                 (6) 
Equation (6) states that the unit-price of good i ,   iQ
iP
 , is the same whether the 
producer adjusts the price (LHS) or the quantity (RHS) in response to a given cost shock. 
Solving (6) for )(i  yields: 
   i i
                    (7) 
Thus, producers who do not experience a marginal cost shock set the quantity 
equal to the expected quantity, eQ . Producers who experience a cost shock either adjust 
the price according to (5) or the quantity according to (5’) and (7). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Although we do not model the producers’ decision process, it is likely that decisions on whether to adjust prices or 
quantities depend on the exact nature of the shocks and on the market structure. For example, some producers argue 
that in competitive markets, it is sometimes better to downsize a good than to increase its price. Source: 
www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2008-06-11-shrinking-sizes_N.htm. 
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(iii) Consumers’ Decision Making Process 
 We assume consumers purchase goods in shops, that all shops are identical and 
that the travel costs are zero. When in a shop, consumers have the option of processing 
goods’ price information, goods’ quantity information, both or neither. All goods enter 
the utility function symmetrically and, therefore, consumers treat them symmetrically. 
We assume, therefore, that consumers either choose to process the price information of 
all goods, or they choose not to process the price information of any good. Similarly, we 
assume that consumers either choose to process the quantity information of all goods, or 
they choose not to process the quantity information of any good. 8 
Consumers therefore choose one of four attention modes. Price attentive 
consumers (PA) process only good’s price information. They therefore know the price of 
every good  iP ,  1,0i , but assume that all goods’ quantities are equal to the expected 
quantity, 
eQ . Quantity attentive (QA) consumers process only goods’ quantity 
information. Therefore, they know the quantity of every good  iQ ,  1,0i , but assume 
that all goods’ prices are equal to the expected price, 
e
P .  
Price and quantity attentive consumers (PQA) process both the price and the 
quantity information of every good i . They therefore know the price  iP , and the 
quantity  iQ  of every good  1,0i . Inattentive consumers (IA) do not process goods’ 
price nor goods’ quantity information. They, therefore, assume that every good’s price 
and quantity equal their expected values 
e
P  and 
eQ , respectively. 
 We denote the cost of processing one price information by P  and the cost of 
processing one quantity information by Q . To ensure that consumers can process both 
price and quantity per package information, we assume that 1 QP  . The discussion 
above suggests that the time required for information processing increases linearly with 
the number of price and quantity information processed. Therefore, the cost of being 
price and quantity inattentive is therefore zero, the cost of being price attentive is 
                                                 
8
 This assumption is similar the one made by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Armstrong and Chen (2009) who assume 
that a certain proportion of the consumers have information about all goods, while the rest of the consumers do not 
have information about any good.  
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1
0 P P
di  , the cost of being quantity attentive is 10 Q Qdi   and the cost of being price 
and quantity attentive is  1
0 P Q P Q
di      .  
We denote the demand of consumers for good  i  in attention mode 
 IAPQAQAPA ,,,
 by  iC  and the consumption bundle of consumers in attention 
mode   by C . 
Following Galí (2008), we define the price level that consumers face in attention 
mode  IAPQAQAPA ,,,  by     

 1
0
1 diiPiC
C
P 

 . Consumers choose the 
attention mode that maximizes their utility subject to the time constraint, 1 NL , 
and their preferences for labor, leisure and information processing. 
The demand of price attentive (PA) consumers for good i ,  iCPA , and the price 
level they face, PAP , are respectively, given by (see the appendix) 
   
 1 1
0
,PA PA
P i
C i Y
P j dj




        
 and              (8) 
 
 
1
1
0
1 11 1
0
.
( )
PA
P j dj
P
P j Q j dj


  

 

   


               (9) 
The demand of quantity attentive (QA) consumers for good i ,  iCQA , and the 
price level they face, QAP , are given respectively by (see the appendix) 
   
   
1
1
1
0
,
QA
QA
YQ i
C i
P iQ j dj




        
 and            (10) 
   
 
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
.QA
P j Q j dj
P
Q j dj







   


             (11) 
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The demand of price and quantity attentive (PQA) consumers for good i , 
 iCPQA , and the price level they face, PQAP , are given respectively by (see the 
appendix) 
 
 
 
    
1
11
0
,
PQA
PQA
P i
YQ i
C i
P i
P i djQ i




       
 and            (12)  
 
 
1
1 11
0
PQA
P j
P djQ j
           
 .             (13) 
The demand of price and quantity inattentive (IA) consumers for good i ,  iCIA , 
and the price level that they face, IAP , are given respectively by (see the appendix) 
    ,IAIA
YC i
P i

 and              (14) 
 
1
1 1
0
( )
.IA
P iP diQ i

 


         
              (15) 
Thus, equation (14) states that inattentive consumers spend an equal fraction of 
their income on each good. Thus, the number of units of each good  they 
purchase equals their expenditure on that good, IAY , divided by the good’s price  iP . 
Consequently, they do not substitute goods that have high unit-prices,  iQ
iP )(
, with goods 
that have lower unit-prices, and therefore they face a higher price level than consumers 
who do substitute. 
 Price and quantity attentive consumers, on the other hand, process both goods’ 
price information and goods’ quantity information. Therefore, equation (12) states that 
they base their consumption decisions on the ratio of goods’ unit-prices,   iQ
iP
 and an 
aggregate of all goods’ unit-prices,    djjQ
jP

 

 11
0
. Consequently, they substitute high 
 1,0i
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unit price goods with low unit price goods and therefore, the price level they face (13), is 
lower than the price level inattentive consumers face. 
Price attentive consumers substitute high price goods with low price goods, but 
they do not substitute goods that have small quantities with goods that have large 
quantities. Thus, their demand for good i , (8), depends negatively on the ratio of goods’ 
prices and an aggregate of all prices,  1 1
0
P j dj , but it does not depend on goods’ 
quantities. The penalty price attentive consumers pay for not processing goods’ quantity 
information is therefore given by the effect that goods’ quantities have on the 
denominator of (9). Because price attentive consumers do not process goods’ quantity 
information, goods with small quantity enter the denominator with the same weight as 
goods with large quantity. Consequently, goods with small quantity decrease the 
denominator and, therefore, increase the price level that price attentive consumers face. 
Quantity attentive consumers substitute goods with small quantities with goods 
with large quantities, but they do not substitute goods that have high prices with goods 
that have low prices. Thus, the share of income that quantity attentive consumers spend 
on good i , (10), depends positively on the ratio of the good’s quantity,  iQ , and an 
aggregate of all goods’ quantities,  1 1
0
Q j dj  .  The penalty quantity attentive 
consumers pay for not processing goods price information is given by the positive effect 
that prices have on the numerator of (11). Because quantity attentive consumers do not 
process price information, goods with high prices are given the same weight in the 
numerator of (11) as goods with lower prices and, therefore, goods with high prices 
increase the price level quantity attentive consumers face.  
Because price attentive and quantity attentive consumers make some of the 
substitutions that price and quantity attentive consumers make but not all, the price level 
they face is lower than the price level that inattentive consumers face but higher than the 
price level that price and quantity attentive consumers face. 
Given the price level under each attention mode, consumers choose the attention 
mode that maximizes their utility (1), subject to their income and time constraints: 
  1 1 1max , , max
1 1 1
k k k
k
C NU C N
  
  
              
          (16) 
s.t. 
k k kC P Y                (17) 
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 0,1k kN                 (18) 
 
where kC  is the aggregate consumption (2) in attention mode k , kN  is the time 
dedicated to labor in attention mode k ,  
( ) ( )k P P Q Qk k                   (19) 
is the time spent on processing goods’ information in attention mode k , P  and Q  are 
indicator functions defined by 
 
 
0 ,( )
1 ,p
if k QA IA
k
if k PA PQA
  
 and           (20) 
 
 
0 ,( )
1 ,q
if k PA IA
k
if k QA PQA
  
,           (21) 
k kY N W                (22) 
is consumers’ nominal income, kP  is the price level consumers face in attention mode k , 
which satisfies 
   1
0
k k k kC P C i P i di  ,             (23) 
and  IAPQAQAPAk ,,, . 
   The first order necessary conditions with respect to kC  and kN  respectively are: 
k kC P
                  (24) 
and 
kN W
    .               (25)  
Dividing (25) by (24) and rearranging terms, we find that as long as the time 
constraint (18), is not binding, aggregate consumption is given by:   
1
kk
k
WC N
P
 
    
.              (26)  
Substituting (26) in the budget constraint (17), we find that as long as the time 
constraint (18) is not binding, the time dedicated to labor kN , is given by 








1
kP
W
. If 
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the time constraint is binding, consumers dedicate to labor all the time that they do not 
spend on processing goods’ information. Thus, 
 
   
1 1
1
1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
p p Q Q
k k
k
p p Q Q p p Q Q
k
W Wif k k
P P
N
Wk k if k k
P
 
   

 
   
       
 
 


                         
      (27) 
Consumers’ nominal income (22), is therefore given by 
 
 
1
1 1
1 ( ) ( )
1
1 ( ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( ) ( )
k p p Q Q
k
k
p p Q Q p p Q Q
k
WW P if k k
P
Y
Wk k W if k k
P
          

        
   
                      
      (28)  
Since consumers spend all their income on consumption, aggregate consumption 
is equal to real income 
k
k
P
Y
, and is therefore given by 
 
 
1 1
1
1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ( )
1 ( ) ( )
( )
p p Q Q
k k
k
k
k p p
p p Q Q
kQ Q
W Wif k k
P P
YC
P k
Wif k kW Pk
P
 
   

 
   
 
    
 
 


                           
      (29) 
Substituting (21), (27) and (29) in (1), we obtain the consumers’ utility: 
 
     
 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
1
k
k
p Q Q p Q Q Q Q
W WU
P P
W Wk k
P P
   
   

 
       

   
 

           
    
          (30) 
if 
 
1
1 ( ) ( )p Q Q Q Q Q
k
W k k
P

       

      
, 
and 
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 
 
1
1
1
1 1 ( ( ) ( ) )
1
1 1 ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
k p p Q Q
k
p Q Q p Q Q Q Q
p Q Q p Q Q Q Q
WU k k
P
W Wk k
P P
W Wk k
P P



   
       
       



        
         
    
        (30’) 
if 
 
1
1 ( ) ( )p Q Q Q
W k k
P

     

       . 
 Taking the nominal wage W , and the costs of processing goods’ information P  
and Q  as given, consumers choose the attention mode which maximizes their utility: 
 max max , , ,PA QA PQA IAU U U U U             (31)  
Since all consumers are identical, all of them choose the same attention mode and 
therefore, all the consumers face the same price level. 
 
4. Calibration and Comparative Statics 
 (i) Benchmark Economy 
To study consumers’ choices of attention modes, we calibrate the model for a 
benchmark economy and simulate it to study the effects of changes in the model’s 
parameters. For the benchmark economy, we assume that the elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to consumption,  , is 0.2 and the elasticity of marginal disutility with 
respect to labor, , is 0.1. Thus, the marginal utility with respect to consumption 
decreases relatively slowly, and the marginal disutility with respect to labor increases 
almost linearly. 
Following Barsky et al.’s (2003), we set the mark up 1.1
1
    and therefore 
the elasticity of substitution between goods,  , equals 11. We normalize the nominal 
wage, W, the producers’ expected marginal cost, , and the expected quantity per 
package, 
eQ  to equal one.  
Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that the 
monthly frequency of consumers’ goods’ price changes is between 11%–25% per month. 
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We therefore set the fraction of producers who experience marginal cost shocks and 
adjust their goods’ prices, P , to 0.15.  
Following Gourville and Kohler (2004) who study changes in the prices and 
quantities of four goods and report that the monthly frequency of changes in quantities is 
between 2.7% and 8.2%, we set the fraction of producers who experience marginal cost 
shocks and adjust their goods’ quantities, Q , equal to 0.05. 
We assume that half of the producers who experience a marginal cost shock 
experience a positive shock, 0h and half experience a negative shock, 0l . In 
addition, we assume that lh   . Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) who 
report that most price changes are in the range of 10%–30%, we set 15.0 lh  .  
Figure 1 divides the P , Q  space into four regions, indicating the combinations of 
the price information processing cost ( P ) and the quantity information processing cost (
Q ) for which consumers are: price attentive (PA), quantity attentive (QA), price and 
quantity attentive (PQA), and inattentive (IA). According to Figure 1, consumers are 
price and quantity attentive if both 0.024P   and Q  is in the range 0.05–0.08.  If  
0.024P   and 0.005Q  , consumers are inattentive. They are price attentive if 
0.008Q   and 0.024P  . They are quantity attentive if 0.024P   and 0.005Q  .9 
Thus, consumers are inattentive even if the total cost of processing price and 
quantity information is relatively small and they are more likely to be price attentive than 
quantity attentive. There are two reasons for the last result. First, we assume that more 
producers adjust prices than quantities. Consequently, consumers have greater benefits 
from processing goods’ price than quantity information. Second, prices enter the budget 
constraint, while quantities enter the utility function. An increase in prices, therefore, has 
a linear effect because it reduces the number of units consumers can buy whereas a 
decrease in quantity has a smaller than linear effect on utility because quantities appear in 
the utility function with coefficient less than 1. 
                                                 
9
 Interpreting the time unit in the model as one month, with 4 weeks/month, 5 days/week, 16 hours/day for labor and 
leisure, and consumers make 8 shopping trips per month, consumers are price and quantity inattentive if processing 
goods’ price and quantity information costs more than a total of 20–60 minutes. For example, when 0.008Q   and 
0P  , consumers need 160601654008.0   minutes/month for processing goods’ information. With 8 
shopping trips/month, they need 160/8= 20 minutes per shopping trip. 
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The model, therefore, explains both Fox and Hoch’s (2005) finding that over 90 
percent of consumers are price and quantity inattentive and Gourville and Kohler’s 
(2004) finding that consumers are more likely to respond to price increases than to 
quantity decreases.  
 
(ii) Changing the Elasticity of Marginal Utility w.r.t. Consumption and Labor 
 Figure 2 depicts the effect of increasing consumers' elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to consumption,  , from 0.2 to 0.05. When   increases, consumers 
have greater incentive to process goods' price and quantity information because their 
utility from consumption increases. Consumers, therefore, devote time and effort to 
processing goods’ price and quantity information for greater costs of information 
processing than consumers in the benchmark setting.  
Figure 3 shows the effect of increasing consumers’ elasticity of marginal disutility 
with respect to labor ,  , from 0.1 to 0.15. When   increases, consumers choose to 
process goods’ price and quantity information for higher costs of information processing. 
The reason is that as   increases, consumers lose more utility from any given amount of 
time they dedicate to labor. They are therefore more willing to trade time devoted to labor 
for time devoted to information processing. 
 
(iii) Changing Consumers’ Wage 
 Figure 4 depicts the effect of decreasing the wage (W) from 1 to 0.9. Changing W 
has two opposite effects on consumers’ choices of attention mode. On the one hand, there 
is a negative substitution effect, because when W increases, time becomes more valuable. 
On the other hand, there is a positive income effect, because when W increases, 
consumers can purchase more packages, and therefore their benefits from lower price 
level increase. Thus, the total effect of the change in the consumers' wage is ambiguous.10 
Simulations using different values of W suggest, however, that when consumers’ income 
decreases, the positive income effect usually dominates the negative substitution effect. 
Low-income consumers are, therefore, more likely to process goods’ price and quantity 
information than consumers with average incomes, which is consistent with the findings 
reported by Gabor and Granger (1961, 1966) and Falkinger (2008).  
 
 
                                                 
10
 Hoch, et al. (1995) find that income has an ambiguous effect on the price elasticity of food and cleaning detergents. 
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(iv) Changing the Fraction of Producers Who Adjust Goods’ Price/Quantity 
Figures 5 and 6 depict the effects of increasing the shares of producers who adjust 
prices, P , and quantities, Q . In Figure 5,  P  increases from 0.15 to 0.25 while in 
Figure 6,  Q  increases from 0.05 to 0.2. The effects of both changes are similar. When 
the fraction of producers who adjust their goods’ prices, P ,  or quantities, Q , 
increases, consumers become price and quantity attentive for larger costs of processing 
goods’ price and quantity information. The reason is that when the fraction of producers 
who adjust either their goods’ prices or quantities increases, the variance of goods’ unit-
prices,   


iQ
iPVar  , increases and, therefore, consumers have greater incentives to 
process goods’ price and quantity information. 
 
(v) Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Goods 
 Figure 7 depicts the ceteris paribus effect of increasing the elasticity of 
substitution , from 11 to 21.11 When   increases, consumers become price and quantity 
attentive for larger costs of processing goods’ price and quantity information. The reason 
is that when   increases, consumers are more willing to substitute high unit-price goods 
with low unit-price goods and, therefore, they benefit more from processing goods’ price 
and quantity information.  
 
(vi) Changing the Expected Marginal Cost 
Increasing the expected marginal cost  , leads to a proportional increase in the 
expected unit-price of all goods. This has two opposite effects on consumers’ choices of 
attention modes. On the one hand, higher expected unit-price has a negative income 
effect, because an increase in the average price reduces real income. On the other hand, 
increasing the expected price while holding the size of the marginal cost shocks 
unchanged reduces the substitution effect, because the relative differences between goods 
that their price differs from the expected price and goods that their prices equal the 
expected price become smaller. Thus, the total effect of an increase in   is ambiguous.  
For example, holding everything else the same as in the benchmark economy, as long as 

 is between 1 and 2.5 consumers process goods’ price and quantity information only 
                                                 
11
 Without the ceteris paribus constraint, an increase in the elasticity of substitution from 11 to 21 would have caused 
producers to reduce their markups from 1.1 to 1.05. 
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for smaller costs of information processing than in the benchmark economy. If 2.5  , 
as in Figure 8 where 3  , the income effect dominates and consumers are price and 
quantity attentive for larger costs of processing goods’ price and quantity information 
than consumers in the benchmark economy.  
 
(vii) Changing the Expected Quantity 
Figure 9 depicts the effect of an increase in goods’ expected quantity, 
eQ , from 1 
to 1.5. When 
eQ  increases, consumers become price and quantity attentive for larger 
costs of processing goods’ price and quantity information. The reason is that when 
eQ  
increases, consumers receive more utility from each package they purchase. 
Consequently, they have greater incentives to process goods’ price and quantity 
information.  
 
 (viii) Changing the Size of the Marginal Cost Shock 
Figure 10 depicts the effect of an increase in the absolute value of the marginal 
cost shocks from 15.0  to 2.0 . When h  and l  increase, consumers become 
price and quantity attentive for larger costs of processing goods’ price and quantity 
information. The reason is that when h  and l increase, the variance of goods’ unit-
prices increases and, therefore, consumers lose more utility if they do not process either 
goods’ price or quantity information.  
 
4. Data 
 Our data comes from two surveys conducted in Israel during 2005–2008. In the 
first survey, we sampled consumers in two supermarkets (supermarkets 1 and 2 in Table 
1) and in the second, in 13 supermarkets (supermarkets 3–15 in Table 1). 11 of the 15 
supermarkets belong to large national chains and the rest are either unaffiliated or 
affiliated with local chains.  
The supermarkets are located in 7 cities. About half of the supermarkets are 
discount supermarkets which offer lower prices, lower quality of services and usually 
carry fewer brands than other supermarkets. Some information about the supermarkets 
and the consumers who live in the cities where they are located is given in Tables 1–3.   
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During the survey period, the Israeli GDP grew at an annual rate of 4%–6.5%.12 
The annual inflation during 2005–2007 was between 0%–2%. It increased to 3.7% in 
2008.13  
In both surveys, consumers were approached as they came out of supermarkets, 
immediately after they finished their shopping. The theory of retrieval cues (Laibson, 
2001, Smith et al., 2003) suggests that consumers are more likely to succeed in retrieving 
information about goods’ prices and quantities at the exit from supermarkets than in other 
places because there they usually have more retrieval cues.14 
Consumers who agreed to participate were first asked about their socio-economic 
status and then they were shown a list of goods.15 Consumers usually needed about five 
minutes to answer all the questions. 
The first survey was conducted before, during and after the Passover holiday in 
April–May 2005. In that survey, the list of goods included 10 goods that were sold at a 
price discount, 10 goods that were sold at a quantity discount, and 10 goods that were 
sold at their list prices.16 Consumers were asked, however, only about goods they 
purchased in their current shopping trips. For each good, consumers were asked to recall 
whether or not it was offered at a discount. Table 4 gives information about the sampled 
goods. 
The second survey was conducted as follows: in Supermarkets 3–5 during April–
July 2006, in Supermarkets 6–9 during April–July 2007 and in Supermarkets 10–15 
during April–October 2008. The lists consumers were shown contained goods belonging 
to one of 17 categories, which represent a large proportion of the goods sold in Israeli 
supermarkets. Table 5 offers the list of categories. It also offers summary statistics of the 
goods that were sampled in Supermarket 3.17 Consumers were asked only about goods 
they purchased in their current shopping trip. For each of these goods, consumers were 
asked to recall the good's price and quantity. Consumers were also asked about purchase 
frequency of the goods, about the number of packages they purchased in the current 
                                                 
12
 Source: www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton60/st14_02x.pdf. 
13
 Source: www.cbs.gov.il/www/price_new/g1_2_h.pdf. 
14
 We were not allowed to interview them inside the supermarkets.  
15
 We asked about 30% of the subjects on their socio-economic status after they finished the main part of the 
questionnaire. This did not significantly affect the responses.  
16
 For each supermarket, the lists were updated every week. An example of a price discount is a 6-pack of 1.5L bottles 
of Pepsi sold for NIS 21.89 instead of the list price of NIS 26.40 (i.e., a lower price for the same quantity). An example 
of a quantity discount is Coca-Cola sold in bottles of 1.75L instead of the standard 1.5L for the same price (i.e., a 
higher quantity for the same price). “Value packs” and “Bonus packs” sometimes offered by US retailers is an example 
of a quantity discount.   
17
 We present Supermarket 3 data as an example because the frequency of price changes in Supermarket 3 is similar to 
the one we find in many of the other supermarkets in the dataset. 
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shopping trip, about consumption frequency of these goods, and whether the goods are 
usually consumed by themselves, by their spouses, by their children or by their friends 
and relatives.18  
 
5. Empirical Tests and Estimation Results 
(i) Test 1: Consumers’ Attention to Goods’ Prices and Quantities 
In the second survey, consumers exiting supermarkets were asked to recall the 
prices and quantities of goods they bought. The psychology literature on depth of 
processing and memorizing techniques suggests that the probability of successfully 
storing and recalling information is correlated with the time and effort dedicated to 
processing it (Smith, et al., 2003, p. 278). We therefore use the errors that consumers 
make in recalling price and quantity information as a proxy for the time and effort they 
devote to processing goods’ price and quantity information (Vanhuele and Drèze, 2002).  
The mean absolute price error in our sample is 33%, which is similar to the figure 
reported by Vanhuele and Drèze (2002). The mean absolute quantity error is close to 
450% suggesting that consumers face greater difficulties in processing quantity 
information than price information. Indeed, evidence suggests consumers and students 
alike face significant difficulties when facing problems about measurement units. 19 In 
addition, the cognitive information processing cost is usually larger for quantity than 
price because it is usually easier to find price information than quantity information 
(Miyazaki et al., 2000). 
Following the model, we assume that the likelihood of correctly recalling goods’ 
price and quantity information depends on consumers’ and goods’ attributes and on 
market conditions. Because we are interested in consumers’ knowledge of both prices 
and quantities, we estimate two regressions. In one, the dependent variable is the absolute 
percentage error consumers make in recalling goods’ price information. In the second, the 
dependent variable is the absolute percentage error made in recalling quantity 
information. Because the errors in recalling the price and quantity information of the 
same good might be correlated, we use the SUR approach. In both regressions, we 
include the same set of independent variables: A gender dummy  (1 if a consumer is a 
                                                 
18
 The survey was conducted in Hebrew. An English version of the questionnaire is available upon request. 
19
 In US standard math exams, for example, about 50 percent of the students fail in questions involving measurement 
units. Source: www.k12.wa.us/research/pubdocs/pdf/mathbook.pdf. See also the discussion on the failure of the metric 
education system in the UK and its possible implications for consumers: 
www.bwmaonline.com/The%20Failure%20of%20Metrication%20by%20Education.htm.  
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woman), an education dummy (1 if a consumer has an academic degree), a large family 
dummy (1 if a consumer’s family has more than five members), a religion dummy (1 if a 
consumer defines himself as moderately religious), a discount supermarket dummy (1 if 
it is a discount supermarket), a location dummy (1 if a supermarket is located outside a 
city), a duration dummy (1 if the good is consumed within a short period), a package 
dummy (1 if a good is sold in multi-unit packages),  the goods’ price and quantity as 
recalled by the consumer, the category-level average price and the average quantity, the 
category-level standard deviation of prices and quantities, the year 2008 dummy, a 
holiday dummy (1 if a good was purchased during a holiday period) and fixed effects for 
goods’ categories, for consumers’ age groups and for the cities where the supermarkets 
are located.20  
We do not have any specific hypothesis about the gender dummy, and we include 
it to avoid missing variables bias. We expect subjects with academic background to have 
lower information processing costs, because evidence from psychology literature 
suggests that the ability to obtain higher education is correlated with better memorization 
and retrieval skills (Dehn, 2008). We expect consumers with large households to have 
greater benefits from processing price and quantity information because such consumers 
often purchase large quantities of each good.  
Consumers with a moderate-Jewish religious background often purchase only 
goods that satisfy strict Kosher requirements. Therefore, brands that satisfy religious 
consumers’ Kosher requirements often have greater market power among religious 
consumers than among the general population. The discussion following Figure 7 
suggests, therefore, that religious consumers will tend to be less likely to process goods’ 
price and quantity information. 
We expect that consumers who shop in discount supermarkets are likely to have 
lower opportunity cost of time and tighter budget constraints than consumers who shop in 
more expensive locations. We therefore expect consumers shopping in discount 
supermarket to be more likely to process goods’ price and quantity information. We do 
not have a priori expectations about consumers who shop in supermarkets located outside 
cities, because although such supermarkets tend to be discount supermarkets, they often 
appeal mostly to consumers with cars who shop on their way home.  
                                                 
20
 We also added a variable for the consumers’ average expenditure, but it was insignificant in both this and the 
regression reported in section (ii), perhaps because we used relatively large expenditure brackets in the survey, and 
consequently much of the variance between consumers was lost.  
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Goods that are consumed within a short period are usually goods for which 
consumers have greater appetite than goods consumed over longer periods. Thus, we 
expect that consumers are more likely to correctly recall the prices and quantities of such 
goods. Goods sold in multi-unit packs offer greater quantity per package and, therefore, 
consumers have greater incentives to process their price and quantity information. 
However, it is also harder to process the quantities of multi-unit packs because the 
calculation involves a multiplication operation.21 We hypothesize, therefore, that 
consumers are more likely to correctly recall multi-unit packs’ prices, but we do not have 
ex-ante predictions about the effect that multi-packs have on the likelihood of recalling 
quantity information.  
Evidence from marketing literature suggests that consumers form reference prices 
for product categories, and that these reference prices depend either on the recalled prices 
of selected brands (internal reference prices) or on the average price in the category 
(external reference price). According to this literature, consumers tend to choose brands 
that offer them the lowest price relative to the reference price rather than the brands that 
offer them the lowest absolute prices (Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995, Mazumdar and 
Papatla, 2000). We therefore include in the regression, goods’ recalled prices and 
quantities together with the average prices and quantities in the category to avoid a 
missing variables bias.22 
The model suggests that an increase in the variance of goods’ prices and 
quantities make consumers more likely to process goods' price and quantity information. 
Increasing the variance, however, also increases the cost of processing price and quantity 
information because there is more information to process. We therefore do not have ex-
ante prediction on the effects of increasing the variance of prices and quantities.  
The inflation in Israel was 3.7 percent in 2008, whereas during earlier years it 
hovered around 0 percent. 2008 was also a year of economic slowdown and, therefore, 
many consumers experienced a decrease in their incomes. We therefore include a 2008 
dummy to control for these two effects. Because moderate inflations are often associated 
with an increase in the share of producers who adjust prices, the discussions following 
Figure 4, 5 and 6 suggest that in 2008 consumers should be more likely to devote time 
                                                 
21
 For example, the quantity of a 6-pack of Pepsi (16 fl oz per bottle) is 6×16= 96 fl oz.  
22
 We find that omitting these variables affects the significance of some of the other variables but it usually has only a 
small effect on the size of the coefficients. 
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and cognitive effort to processing goods’ price and quantity information than in 2006 and 
2007 (Gagnon, 2009). 
As discussed above, consumers are likely to have greater marginal benefits from 
consumption in holidays than in other times both because they have more leisure and 
because consumption in holidays often takes place in social settings. Thus, we 
hypothesize that during holidays, consumers should be more likely to process goods’ 
price and quantity information.   
Because the dependent variables are the absolute percentage errors consumers 
make, negative coefficients indicate better recall. We, therefore, expect that the variables 
that increase consumers’ benefits from information processing to have negative 
coefficients in both regressions, while the variables that increase the costs of information 
processing to have positive coefficients. In addition, we expect that variables that affect 
the costs side have stronger effects in the quantity regression than in the price regression 
because the cost of processing quantity information is greater, and also because the 
evidence suggests that changes in cognitive costs affect behavior more when the 
cognitive costs are high than when they are low. For example, Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002, p. 68) find that if cognitive costs are low, all subjects tend to process information 
efficiently but if cognitive costs are high subjects with less efficient processing skills use 
heuristics instead of efficient processing.     
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. From the discussion above it 
follows that the coefficients of  academic degree, family has more than five members, 
discount supermarket, goods consumed within a short period, year 2008 and holiday, 
should have negative coefficients. The variable moderately religious should have a 
positive coefficient. We find that the coefficients of all these controls except for the 
coefficient of families with more than five members are indeed significant in at least one 
of the regressions and all the statistically significant coefficients have the expected 
signs.23 As hypothesized above, the effects are greater in the quantity regression than in 
the price regression, because the costs of processing quantity information is greater than 
the costs of processing price information. All the coefficients are at least marginally 
significant in the quantity regression but some are not significant in the price regression.  
Consistent with our hypothesis that during holidays consumers have greater 
marginal utility from consumption, we find that during holidays consumers are more 
                                                 
23
 In our sample, there is relatively low variance in the family size. The largest families have 6 members and the 
average families have about 4 members.  
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likely to correctly recall both goods' prices and quantities.  Thus, the results suggest that 
producers face different demand elasticities for prices and quantities in holidays relative 
to other time, which may partly explain the greater price rigidity observed during 
holidays (Warner and Barsky, 1995, Chevalier et al., 2003, Levy et al., 2010).  
The results also suggest that goods' attributes have the expected effects. 
Consumers are more likely to correctly recall the quantities of goods consumed within a 
short period and the prices of goods sold in multi-packs. At the same time, they are less 
likely to correctly recall the quantities of goods sold in multi-packs, suggesting that 
although consumers have greater incentives to process the quantities of multi-packs than 
of other goods, the greater cognitive costs required for processing the quantities in multi-
packs relative to other goods have an even greater effect. 
Increasing the category variance has a similar effect to selling goods in multi-
packs. Thus, increasing the variance of prices in a category seems to increase the 
likelihood of correctly recalling price information. At the same time, an increase in the 
variance of the quantities in a category reduces the likelihood of a correct recall. The 
results, therefore, suggest again that the costs of processing quantity information are 
greater than the costs of processing price information. Thus, if the variance of prices 
increases, the positive effect of an increase in the benefits dominates (Krieder and Han, 
2004). If the variance of quantities increases, the negative effect of the increase in the 
costs dominates.24  
The coefficients of woman are positive and significant in both regressions. Thus, 
in our data, men tend to make smaller errors than women.25 The discussion above 
suggests that consumers should be more likely to recall goods price and quantity 
information in 2008 than in 2006 and 2007. Consistent with these predictions, the 
coefficients of the 2008 dummy are negative in both regressions.  
The holiday coefficients are negative in both regressions, suggesting, as discussed 
above, that consumers have higher marginal utility from consumption in holidays, and 
therefore, they are more likely to process price and especially quantity information.  
 
                                                 
24
 We included the recalled prices and quantities and the categories' average prices and quantities to control for 
reference price effects. The coefficients we obtained for categories’ average prices and categories' average quantities 
are negative, whereas the coefficients of the recalled price and recalled quantities are positive, suggesting that 
consumers in our sample use external reference prices. The positive effects of recalled prices and quantities suggest 
that as goods’ prices and quantities increase, so does the range of possible errors.    
25
 Studies suggest that women pay more attention than men to prices (Raajpoot, et al. 2008). However, modern social 
trends are altering the traditional roles, and consequently the shopping behavior, of men and women (Mortimer, 2009).    
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(ii) Test 2: Consumers’ Attention to Price and Quantity Discounts 
Some authors criticize the use of price recall information as a proxy for the 
knowledge that consumers have about goods’ prices because price recall surveys ask for 
information that consumers might store in non verbal code and therefore, consumers 
might fail to give correct answers even if they know them (Monroe and Lee, 1999, 
Vanhuele and Dréze, 2002).26 We, therefore, use data from the first survey to study the 
likelihood that consumers correctly recall whether or not goods are offered at a discount. 
This offers a more conservative test than the one reported in section (i) for several 
reasons. First, the gains from processing discount information can be large.27 Second, 
discount information is usually more visible and, therefore, easier to process than other 
types of price and quantity information. Third, recalling whether or not a good is sold at a 
discount involves only a yes-or-no answer, and therefore it is easier to recall than the 
goods’ exact price and quantity (Monroe and Lee, 1999, Vanhuele and Drèze, 2002). 
Indeed, we find that consumers correctly recall whether or not a good is offered at a 
discount in about 70% of the cases, whereas Vanhuele and Dréze (2002) report that only 
about 2% of the consumers correctly recall goods’ exact prices.  
Following our model, we assume that the likelihood that consumers correctly 
recall goods’ price and quantity information depends on their choice of attention mode 
and on goods’ attributes. We further assume that consumers choose between two 
attention modes, attentive and inattentive, where attentive consumers are more likely to 
recall whether or not a good is offered at a discount. In addition, we assume that goods’ 
attributes have the same effect on both types of consumers. Following Gupta and 
Chintagunta (1994), we use a logistic mixture model to simultaneously estimate the 
effects of the consumers’ and goods’ attributes. Thus, we maximize:28  
 
  )32(.
log)(
1
j
N
i
i
ZattributeshasgoodpurchasedthewhencresponsegaveconsumerTheP
kmodechoseXattributeswithConsumerPLLog 


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 According to cognitive psychologists there are two ways of storing information in memory. Explicit memory is for 
storing information used verbally. Implicit memory is for storing information used in non-verbal settings, e.g., riding a 
bike (Smith et al. 2003, p. 269). Monroe and Lee (1999) suggest that asking consumers to give verbal responses to 
questions about goods’ prices might underestimate their knowledge, because they likely use non-verbal code to store 
information in long-term memory. They argue that because price information is used for internal comparisons, it is 
likely to be stored in implicit memory and consequently, consumers are likely to find it difficult to recall them verbally.  
27
 The average discount at the two supermarkets surveyed was 15%–20% of the list prices. 
28
 We have tried logit and multi-logit specifications as well. In all cases, we obtained similar results. 
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where L is the likelihood function, N is the number of consumers, P is the logistic 
probability function,  einattentivattentivek , ,  incorrectcorrectc ,  , iX  is the set 
of attributes of consumer i, and jZ  is the set of attributes of good j.  
 We assume that consumers’ attributes, include the following dummy variables: 
woman, academic degree, large family, moderately religious, age (1 if a consumer is 45–
55 years old), cashier-parking (1 if a consumer answered that both the number of 
cashiers and the availability of parking are very important to him), and Passover (1 if the 
observation was collected during the Passover holiday).  
 We hypothesize that the effect of woman, academic degree, large family and 
moderately religious variables will be similar to what we discussed in section (i). We 
include the age variable because pre-tests and previous empirical studies suggest that 
consumers in the 40–55 age group are more likely than other consumers to correctly 
recall goods’ prices (Fox and Hoch, 2005).29 We include the cashier-parking variable 
because consumers who care more about both the number of parking places and the 
number of cashiers are more likely to be time constrained and, therefore, less likely to 
process goods' price and quantity information. We include the Passover variable because 
it is one of the main holidays in the Jewish calendar, and the main family get-together 
event. The discussion above suggests, therefore, that consumers should be more likely to 
process goods’ price and quantity information in Passover than in other periods. 
 We assume that goods’ set of attributes include the following dummy variables: 
small-discount (1 if the discount < 10 percent), supermarket 2 (1 if the good was 
purchased at supermarket 2 and 0 if it was purchased at supermarket 1), price discount (1 
if a good was offered at a price discount), quantity discount (1 if a good was offered at a 
quantity discount), and interactions of the Passover dummy and “more than NIS 20” 
dummy (1 if a good costs NIS 20 or more), price discount and quantity discount.30 We 
also include fixed effects for goods’ categories, to control for variation in the market 
structure.  
 We include the small-discount variable because the model suggests that 
consumers are less likely to process goods’ price and quantity information if the benefit 
from doing so is relatively small. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that consumers 
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 We also estimated the regression with age fixed effects. The results were similar to what we report here. 
30
 We chose to define goods costing more than NIS 20 (about $5)as “expensive” because NIS 20 is about double the 
average cost of a good in a supermarket in the sample period (source: www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=/prices_db/). The 
coefficient of the main effect of “costs NIS 20 or more” is statistically insignificant and has no significant effect on 
other coefficients. We therefore dropped it from the regression.  
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are less likely to process information about small discounts than about larger ones 
(Krieder and Han, 2004, Chen et al., 2008). We include the Supermarket 2 variable to 
control for differences in consumers' behavior between Supermarket 1 which is a 
discount supermarket and Supermarket 2 which is located in a high income 
neighborhood. Price and quantity discounts control for whether a good was offered at a 
price or a quantity discount. Their coefficient can indicate which type of a discount is 
more likely to be processed and correctly recalled by consumers. We expect that because 
processing price information is easier than processing quantity information, consumers 
are more likely to recall price discounts than quantity discounts.  
The model predicts that holding the relative size of price changes the same, 
consumers should be more likely to process goods’ price and quantity information if the 
goods’ prices are high. We expect, therefore, that the coefficient of the interaction term of 
more than NIS 20 and Passover is positive, i.e., consumers are more likely to process 
goods’ information if the goods are relatively expensive. 
 We include the interaction terms of Passover and the price and quantity discounts 
because the model suggests that during holidays consumers dedicate more time and 
cognitive effort to processing goods’ price and quantity information. The interaction 
terms between Passover and price and quantity discounts control for any changes in the 
likelihood consumers correctly recall price and quantity discounts during Passover period 
relative to other periods. 
 The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of (32) are reported in Table 7 
along with robust standard errors. The coefficients of woman and academic degree are 
not significant, although their signs are consistent with the regression in section (i). As 
expected, the coefficient of large families is positive and significant.  
Consumers in the 45–55 age group are, as predicted above, more likely than 
consumers of other age to correctly recall discounts. As predicted, moderately religious 
consumers are less likely to correctly recall discounts. The coefficient of the Passover 
dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that consumers indeed have greater 
marginal utility from consumption and, therefore, devote more time and effort to 
processing goods' price and quantity information..31  
There is an alternative explanation, however. During Passover there are more 
discounts than during other times, and therefore they are more noticeable. To account for 
                                                 
31
 The Passover period in Israel is similar to the Christmas period in the US (Warner and Barsky, 1995, Chevalier et al., 
2003, Levy et al., 2010). 
 26
this, we take advantage of the fact that most discounts start one week before the Passover 
holiday and last one week beyond Passover. Thus, consumers face the same number of 
price and quantity discounts in all these three weeks. If consumers are more attentive to 
discounts because they are more noticeable, then consumers should be equally likely to 
recall whether or not a good is offered at a discount during all these three weeks. On the 
other hand, if consumers are more likely to recall discounts only when they have high 
marginal utility of consumption, they will be more likely to recall discounts only during 
Passover. 
We use ANOVA to compare the likelihood that consumers correctly recall 
whether or not goods are offered at a discount during these three weeks. We find no 
statistical differences between the probability of correctly recalling discounts in the 
weeks before and after Passover (F = 0.14, p > 0.7), but the probability of correctly 
recalling discounts during the week of the holiday is significantly greater than in the 
weeks before (F = 32.65, p < 0.01) and after the holiday (F = 19.33, p < 0.01). This 
suggests, therefore, that the increase in the likelihood of correctly recalling discounts is, 
as we hypothesize, due to higher marginal utility of consumption and not due to the 
higher salience of the discounts.  
The effects of goods’ attributes are as follows. As predicted above, consumers are 
less likely to recall discounts of 10 percent or less. They are also less likely to recall 
discounts if they shop at the expensive supermarket 2.  
The coefficient of the interaction of holiday and costs NIS 20 or more is positive 
and significant, suggesting that consumers are more likely to process the price and 
quantity information of more expensive goods. 
The coefficients of both price discount and quantity discount are positive and 
significant. However, the coefficient of price discount is significantly greater than the 
coefficient of quantity discount (  21 3.17,   p < 0.1), which suggests that during non-
holidays consumers are more likely to process goods’ price information than quantity 
information. During holidays, however, the interaction of holiday and price discount is 
insignificant, whereas the interaction of holiday and quantity discount is positive and 
significant. Thus, during holidays consumers are marginally more likely to recall quantity 
discounts than price discounts (  21 3.51,   p < 0.1). This may explain why producers in 
Israel are more likely to offer quantity discounts in Passover and other major holidays 
than in other times. During the sample period, for example, almost half of the discounts 
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offered during the Passover at both supermarkets were quantity discounts compared with 
a much smaller proportion in other periods.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 A large body of empirical research suggests that nominal price rigidity is a 
common phenomenon. Nominal price rigidity, however, might be inconsequential for 
efficient allocation if some other attribute of the product changes while the price remains 
unchanged. For example, Carlton (1989, 1991), Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Levy et al. 
(2010) and Armstrong and Chen (2009) suggest that if producers have more information 
than consumers about goods’ attributes, they may use non-price (rather than price) 
adjustment mechanisms and, consequently, the market may reach a new equilibrium even 
if prices remain unchanged. 
 In this paper, we study an economy where producers sometimes adjust goods' 
quantity (per package) rather than prices in response to changes in market conditions.  
According to Swan’s (1970) theorem, consumers should be indifferent between price and 
quantity adjustments as long as the unit-prices are the same. Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that consumers often respond to price adjustments differently than to 
quantity adjustments. 
 We construct, calibrate, and test a model that offers a possible explanation for this 
finding. In the model, consumers face cognitive information processing costs and have to 
choose whether to process goods’ price information, goods’ quantity information, both, 
or neither.  
We test the model’s predictions using data from two surveys we conducted in 
Israel on the information consumers have about goods’ prices and quantities. The model 
and the empirical findings suggest that information processing costs are important 
determinants of the information consumers have on goods’ prices and quantities. 
The study has some limitations. First, the model we formulate is static. Extending 
the model to a dynamic, strategic setting may be useful for understanding the effects of 
information processing costs on consumers' behavior and on producers' adjustment 
strategies over the cycle. A dynamic model may also assist in studying the behavior of 
producers if consumers' information processing costs lead to antagonization costs 
(Blinder et al., 1998, Rotemberg, 2005). Also, we focus on consumers' decision and 
therefore the proportion of the producers that respond to cost shocks by adjusting their 
price/quantity is given exogenously. An extension of our model could consider 
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endogenizing these decisions. On the empirical front, more work is needed to assess the 
empirical relevance of cognitive processing costs for consumers’ behavior, and for 
understanding the responses of producers and consumers to changes in these costs 
(Rotemberg, 1983, 2005, Gabaix et al., 2006). More research is needed also to better 
understand consumers’ responses to quantity decreases, because the anger consumers 
often express when they discover a quantity decrease, can affect the long-term 
relationship between producers and consumers (Blinder et al., 1998, Rotemberg 2005). 
Studying the relevance of our findings for other non-price adjustment mechanisms such 
as quality adjustment (e.g., Armstrong and Chen, 2009) can be another fruitful direction 
for future research.. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Demand of Price Attentive Consumers and the Price Level They Face 
  
 Price attentive consumers process all goods’ price information but they assume 
that all goods’ quantity per package equal the expected quantity per package eQ . For a 
given income, maximizing utility is equivalent to maximizing the consumption bundle. 
Price Attentive consumers, therefore, choose  iCPA  for all  1,0i  which maximizes 
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Denoting the Lagrange multiplier with  , the Lagrangian is given by 
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Differentiating (A1.2) with respect to  iPAC  and setting the result equal to zero, 
yields: 
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Differentiating with respect to  PAC j and setting the result equal to zero yields 
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Dividing (A1.3) by (A1.4) yields: 
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Thus, the consumption of good j  as a function of the consumption of good i  is given by: 
      iCjP
iPjC PAPA



                                     (A1.6) 
Using (A1.6) to substitute for the consumption of each good  1,0j  in the budget 
constraint (A1.1), we obtain: 
        (A1.7) 
Rearranging the LHS yields: 
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The price index that price attentive consumers face is defined by: 
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1
0
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where PAC  is the aggregate consumption bundle of price attentive consumers. It is 
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Dividing both sides of (A1.11) by )(iCPA  and  iP  we obtain: 
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Thus, the price level price attentive consumers face is given by: 
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2. Demand of Quantity Attentive Consumers and the Price Level They Face 
 
Quantity attentive consumers process all goods’ quantity per package information 
but they assume that all goods’ prices equal the expected price 
e
P . They, therefore, 
choose  iCQA  for every  1,0i  which maximizes    
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Denoting the Lagrange multiplier with  , the Lagrangian is given by 
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Differentiating (A2.2) with respect to )(iCQA , and setting the result equal to zero yields: 
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Differentiating (A2.2) with respect to ( )QAC j  and setting the result equal to zero yields: 
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Dividing (A2.3) by (A2.4) yields: 
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Rearranging terms, we find that: 
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Thus, the consumption of good j  as a function of the consumption of good i  is given by: 
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Using (A2.7) to substitute for the consumption of each good  1,0j  in the 
budget constraint (A2.1), we obtain: 
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Rearranging the LHS we get: 
      
1
0
11
QA
e
QA YdjjQPiQiC         (A2.9) 
Dividing by   ePiQ 1  yields the number of units of good i  that quantity attentive 
consumers expect to purchase: 
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However, because the actual price of good i ,  iP , might deviate from the expected price 
, the actual amount of good i  that quantity attentive consumers purchase is given by: 
   
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
 1
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YiQ
iC QAQA
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
                                 (A2.11) 
 The price index that quantity attentive consumers face is defined by: 
   
1
0
diiPiCPC QAQAQA                   (A2.12) 
where QAC  is the aggregate consumption bundle of quantity attentive consumers. It is 
defined by .)()(
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diiQiCC QAQA   
We use some good  1,0i  as a numeraire and we use equation (A2.7) to substitute for 
the consumption of every good  in both sides of (A2.12). Doing so yields 
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              (A2.13) 
Dividing both sides by )(iCQA  and   1iQ  we get: 
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                (A2.14) 
Thus, the price level that quantity attentive consumers face is given by: 
e
P
 1,0j
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3. Demand of Price and Quantity Attentive Consumers and the Price Level They 
Face 
 
Price and quantity attentive consumers choose  iCPQA  for every  1,0i  which 
maximizes      11
0
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
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diiQiCC PQAPQA , subject to the budget constraint: 
   
1
0
PQA PQAC i P i di Y          (A3.1)  
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier with  , the Lagrangian is given by: 
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    (A3.2)                  
Differentiating (A3.2) with respect to  iCPQA  and setting the result equal to zero yields 
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    (A3.3) 
Differentiating (A3.2) with respect to  PQAC j  and setting the result equal to zero yields 
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





















 

111
1
0
1
    (A3.4) 
Dividing (A3.3) by (A3.4) yields: 
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        (A3.5) 
Rearranging terms, we find that: 
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Thus, the consumption of good j  as a function of the consumption of good i  is given by: 
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       (A3.7) 
We use equation (A3.7) to substitute for the consumption of every good  1,0j   in the 
budget constraint (A3.1). Doing so yields: 
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Rearranging the LHS yields: 
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      (A3.9) 
Thus, the demand function of price and quantity attentive consumers for good i  is given 
by 
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The price level that price and quantity attentive consumers face is defined by: 
   
1
0
diiPiCPC PQAPQAPQA                  (A3.11) 
where PQAC  is the aggregate consumption bundle of price and quantity attentive 
consumers. It is defined by .)()(
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We use some good  1,0i  as a numeraire and we use (A3.7) to substitute for the 
consumption of every good  in both sides of (A3.11). Doing so yields 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividing both sides by )(iC ,  iP ,  and   1iQ , we obtain: 
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Thus, the price level that price and quantity attentive consumers face is given by: 
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4. Demand of Inattentive Consumers and the Price Level They Face 
 
Price and quantity inattentive consumers assume that all goods’ prices equal the 
expected price, 
e
P , and that all goods’ quantity per package equal the expected quantity 
per package, 
eQ . They, therefore, maximize  
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diQiC eIA , subject to the 
budget constraint 
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Denoting the Lagrange multiplier with  , the Lagrangian is given by 
 1,0j
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Differentiating (A4.2) with respect to  iCIA , and setting the result equal to zero yields: 
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Differentiating (A3.2) with respect to  IAC j  and setting the result equal to zero yields: 
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Dividing (A3.3) by (A3.4) yields: 
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

 
iC
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Thus, the consumption of good j  as a function of the consumption of good i  is given by: 
   iCjC IAIA            (A4.6) 
 To find the consumption that price and quantity inattentive consumers expect we 
use (A4.6) to substitute the consumption of each good  1,0j   in the budget constraint 
(A4.1). Doing so yields:  
  IAeIA YdjPiC 
1
0
          (A4.7) 
Thus the expected consumption is: 
 
e
IA
IA
P
YiC 
           (A4.8) 
However, because the actual price  iP   can deviate from the expected price eP , the 
actual amount that price and quantity inattentive consumers purchase is given by: 
   iP
YiC IAIA             (A4.9) 
The price level that price and quantity inattentive consumers face is defined by: 
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where IAC  is the aggregate consumption bundle of price and quantity inattentive 
consumers. It is defined by .)()(
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We use some good  1,0i  as a numeraire and we use equation (A4.6) to substitute for 
the consumption of every good  in both sides of (A4.10). Doing so yields 
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Dividing both sides by IAY  we get: 
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Thus, the price level that price and quantity inattentive consumers face is given by: 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Supermarkets Surveyed 
Supermarket City Supermarket 
Chain 
Discount Type of 
Location 
Location 
1 Petah-Tiquah Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
2 Rehovot Blue Center No Street Suburb 
3 Givat Shemuel Blue Center No Shopping Center City Center 
4 Petah-Tiquah Private Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
5 Bnei Beraq Blue Center Yes Street City Center 
6 Alef Petah-Tiquah Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
7 Yad Yitzhak Petah-Tiquah Private Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
8 Ramat-Gan Shufersal No Shopping Center City Center 
9 Ramat-Gan Blue Center No Shopping Center Suburb 
10 Netanya Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
11 Petah-Tiquah Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
12 Netanya Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone Outside 
13 Tel-Aviv Shufersal Yes Shopping Zone City Center 
14 Bat-Yam Private Yes Shopping-Zone City-Center 
15 Tel-Aviv Private Yes Shopping-Zone Suburb 
 
Notes:  
There are two large supermarket chains, Shufersal and Blue Center. 
Discount column indicates whether or not the supermarket is promoted as a low-price supermarket. 
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Table 2. Socio-Economic Status of Consumers by Cities Where the Supermarkets Are Located 
City Income 
in NIS 
Unemployment Computer Cars Household  Academics Immigrants Economic-
Status 
Petah-Tiquah 6,386 7.6% 63% 59% 3.2 15% 29.3% 7 
Rehovot 6,952 8.2% 67% 74% 3.3 15% 20.8% 7 
Givat Shemuel 7,412 7.8% 52% 60% 2.5 18% 10.2% 8 
Bnei Beraq 4,735 10.6% 38% 18% 4.0 8% 6.9% 2 
Netanya 5,339 12.9% 41% 54% 3.0 13% 26.6% 5 
Bat-Yam 4,807 11.6% 37% 36% 2.8 11% 32.1% 6 
Tel Aviv 7,214 10.0% 57% 46% 2.3 20% 12.2% 8 
 
Notes: 
Income = the average wage of an employed person in 2001 in NIS (The exchange rate was NIS4.21/US$1). Unemployment = 
unemployment rate in 2002. Computer = the share of households that owned at least one computer in 2002. Cars = the share of 
households with at least one car in 2002. Household = the size of the average household in 2002. Academics = the share of population 
with BA or higher degree in 1995. Immigrants = the share of population in 2002 that immigrated to Israel after 1989. Economic Status 
= Israel Central Bureau of Statistics index ranking cities on a scale of 1–10, where 1 indicates the lowest socio-economic status and 10 
indicates the highest socio-economic status. Source: Israel Central Bureau of statistics (2002), and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 
Socio-Economic Index for Cities, 1995, 
www.cbs.gov.il/mifkad/tables/pirsom13/13.xls. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Surveyed Consumers by Supermarket 
Supermarket Women Age Group Academics Family Size #Cars Religious 
Expenditures 
in NIS #Goods #Observations 
1 56% 18–24 (24%) 35% 
3.56 
(1.24) 
1.5 
(0.86) 10% 
270 
(101.4) 8.0 46 
2 59% 46–55 (29%) 58% 4.20 
1.8 
(0.82) 16.6% 
359 
(76.8) 5.6 208 
3 70% 25–34 (34%) 56% 
3.38 
(1.59) 
2.3 
(0.68) 14.5% 
226 
(171) 2.4 152 
4 57% 35–45 (33%) 61% 
3.71 
(1.36) 
2.63 
(0.69) 13.0% 
468.5 
(151.53) 5.2 100 
5 70% 46–55 (46%) 56% 
5.24 
(1.16) 
1.9 
(0.8) 100% 
353.65 
(176.91) 3.1 41 
6 44% 35–45 (39%) 53% 
3.90 
(1.49) 
2.44 
(0.85) 25.4% 
131.58 
(102.67) 5.1 114 
7 49% 46–55 (30%) 50% 
4.30 
(1.43) 
2.71 
(0.96) 48.6% 
221.43 
(144.68) 4.6 70 
8 71% 25–34 (32%) 56% 
3.63 
(1.61) 
2.1 
(0.74) 43.9% 
321.95 
(153.32) 4.4 41 
932 49% Under 24 (31%) 85% 
3.87 
(1.67) 
2.16 
(0.86) 52.4% 
197.83 
(110.27) 2.5 61 
10 71% 25–34 (34%) 56% 
3.53 
(1.40) 
1.12 
(0.81) 50.0% 
264.5 
(145.87) 4.7 100 
11 57% 25–34  (55%) 70% 
3.54 
(1.29) 
2.34 
(0.69) 65.6% 
400.0 
(157.78) 3.6 99 
12 57% 35–45 (34%) 53% 
4.17 
(1.46) 
2.38 
(0.70) 44.54% 
475.91 
(159.66) 2.3 110 
13 58% 46–55 (37%) 47% 
3.32 
(1.49) 
2.21 
(0.80) 15.71% 
409.29 
(178.82) 4.1 70 
14 66% 36–45 (28%) 27% 
3.51 
(1.33) 
1.5 
(0.93) 15% 
386.67 
(153.17) 3.75 60 
15 65% 46–55 (28%) 32% 
3.1 
(1.26) 
1.84 
(1.33) 7% 
274.16 
(151,12) 8.1 60 
 
Notes: 
Supermarket  = code of the supermarket (Table 1). Women = % of women. Age Group = the most common age group, in parentheses: the 
percentage of that group in the city population. Academics = % with a BA or higher degree. Family Size = the average family size with the 
standard deviation. #Cars = the average number of cars with the standard deviation. Religious = % of religious or very religious (orthodox Jews). 
Expenditure = average amount spent during a shopping trip with the standard deviation.  #Goods = average number of sampled goods purchased. 
#Observations = number of consumers surveyed. The exchange rate during the period was NIS 4.37/US$1. 
                                                 
32
 This supermarket is located on a university campus and thus most shoppers there are students who usually buy only 
few items. 
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Table 4. Product Categories Included In the First Survey 
Category #Brands P > NIS 20 
Turkish Coffee 4 No 
Instant Coffee 6 Yes 
Bamba Peanut Snack 4 No 
Lemon/Lime Soft Drink (6-Pack) 2 Yes 
Mineral Water (6-Pack) 5 No 
Coca Cola (6-Pack) 5 Yes 
Orange Juice 6 No 
Chocolate Spread 5 No 
Soft Cheese 8 No 
Yoghurt (8-pack) 4 No 
Beer (6-pack) 2 Yes 
Ice Cream 3 Yes 
Sugar 2 No 
Thick and Creamy Snack 2 No 
Pasta and Rice 4 No 
Dish Soap 5 No 
Cleaning Detergent 4 No 
Humus and Tahina salad 4 No 
Ready Made Cake 4 No 
Processed Meat 5 No 
Shampoo 2 No 
Pickled Cucumbers 2 No 
BBQ Equipment 4 Yes 
Basic Food 7 No 
Tomato Concentrate 2 No 
Fruits 1 No 
Sweet Red Wine 2 No 
Toilet Paper 2 No 
Waffles 2 No 
Crackers 4 No 
Butter and Margarine 2 No 
Clothing 2 No 
Snack Cup Noodles 2 No 
Ketchup 3 No 
Ice Cream Snacks 2 Yes 
Eggplant Salad 3 No 
Cabbage Salad 4 No 
Total 130  
 
Notes: 
#Brand = number of brands in the category. P > NIS 20 = Is the average price in the category higher 
than NIS 20 or not? 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for Product Categories in Supermarket 3 
 
Notes:  
The prices in each category are reported  for the categories’ standard units, which are: 1.5 liters for the Coca-Cola, Diet Coca-Cola 
and mineral water categories; 100g for black coffee, chocolate waffles, dairy chocolate, canned tuna, tomato concentrate and 
canned corn categories; 8g for Bamba peanut snacks; 500g for chocolate spread; 250g for cottage cheese; 1kg for sugar; 4 liters for 
fabric softener, 12 eggs, 50 diapers and 100 plastic cups. The Average Quantity indicates the average package size/content in a 
category. In categories where packages contain more than one unit the average quantity reported is the number of unites per 
package(e.g., in the mineral waters category, each pack contains 6 bottles). The price changes column indicates the average number 
of price changes per week per category over the 11-weeks period. The Brands column indicates the number of brands sold in each 
category.   
Category Max Price 
Min 
Price 
Average 
Price 
Average 
Quantity 
Price 
Changes 
Share of 
Consumers 
frequency Brands 
Coca-Cola 6.29  4.42 5.04 1.63 liters 0.11 30% 0.30 4 
Diet Coca-Cola 6.29   4.49 5.27 1.5 liters 0.05 20% 0.20 3 
Mineral Water, 6-pack 15.99 10.00 14.19 9.75 liters 0.06 25% 0.25 4 
Black Coffee 8.00 3.66 6.20 0.218kg 0.015 16% 0.16 8 
Chocolate Waffles 5.40 1.30 12.83 0.325kg 0.006 4% 0.04 6 
Bamba Peanut Snack 4.49 2.99 3.94 0.08kg 0 32% 0.32 7 
Chocolate Spread 17.84 10.99 11.62 0.475kg 0.016 9% 0.09 4 
Dairy Chocolate 10.99 5.49 10.34 0.098kg 0 9% 0.09 8 
Canned Tuna 5.99 4.25 5.06 0.148kg 0.049 12% 0.12 7 
Tomato Concentrate 9.23 5.99 5.06 0.38kg 0.036 9% 0.09 3 
Canned Corn 10.98 5.49 7.00 0.44kg 0.0779 4% 0.04 5 
Sugar 9.49 3.99 5.06 1.00 kg 0.03 4% 0.04 4 
Eggs, medium size 20.99 9.40 15.92 12 0.068 17% 0.17 3 
Cottage Cheese 5.79 4.82 12.14 0.25kg 0.064 37.5% 0.375 3 
Diapers 71.99 39.98 57.38 54.18 0.018 4% 0.04 4 
Fabric Softener 26.99 19.99 23.73 4 liters 0.052 7% 0.07 6 
Plastic Cups  4.49 4.49 4.49 100 0 16% 0.16 1 
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Table 6. Consumers’ Knowledge of Goods’ Prices and Quantities 
Variable 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage Price Recall Error Percentage Quantity Recall Error 
Religion -0.031 
(0.082) 
1.04* 
(0.625) 
Academic -0.015 
(0.073) 
-1.83*** 
(0.551) 
Gender 0.119* 
(0.071) 
0.889* 
(0.537) 
Large Family -0.075 
(0.102) 
-0.951 
(0.773) 
Discount Supermarket 0.051 
(0.291) 
-3.86* 
(2.21) 
Outside City 0.19 
(0.28) 
2.52 
(2.12) 
Multi-Unit Pack -1.09*** 
(0.123) 
2.86*** 
(0.936) 
Goods Consumed within a Short 
Period 
0.008 
(0.125) 
-2.55*** 
(0.949) 
Recalled Price 0.081*** 
(0.002) 
-0.028** 
(0.014) 
Average Category Price -0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.055 
(0.068) 
Recalled Quantity -0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.079*** 
(0.007) 
Average Category Quantity -0.0003 
(0.0013) 
-0.145*** 
(0.01) 
Category Price SD -0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.07) 
Category Quantity SD -0.0004 
(0.0007) 
0.0209** 
(0.013) 
Year 2008 -0.224* 
(0.144) 
-6.75*** 
(1.11) 
 Holiday -0.158* 
(0.096) 
-1.62** 
(0.74) 
Constant 0.248 
(0.254) 
4.5** 
(1.93) 
Number of Observations 4184 4184 
2  2071.7*** 1349.8*** 
 
Notes:  
We used the SUR method. The dependent variables are the absolute values of the percentage price recall error and 
quantity recall error. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
*- Significant at 10%. **- Significant at 5%. ***-Significant at 1%. 
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Table 7. Probability of a Correct Recall, Conditional on Consumers’ Attention Mode 
 
Consumers’ attributes Goods’ Attributes 
Religion -0.257* 
(0.17) 
Small Discount -1.153*** 
(0.285) 
Academic 0.111 
(0.12) 
Supermarket-2 Dummy -0.935*** 
(0.229) 
Gender -0.08 
(0.119) 
Holiday   Expensive 20 2.06*** 
(0.422) 
Large Family 0.659*** 
(0.21) 
Price Discount 1.789*** 
(0.24) 
Middle Age 0.486*** 
(0.146) 
Quantity Discount 1.315*** 
(0.217) 
Cashier-Parking -0.271** 
(0.123) 
Holiday   Price Discount -0.325 
(0.365) 
Holiday 0.868*** 
(0.154) 
Holiday   Quantity Discount 1.02*** 
(0.3) 
Constant 0.569*** 
(0.125) 
Constant 0.871 
(0.639) 
Number of Observations 1443 
Log Likelihood -1597.94 
2  57.85*** 
Notes: 
Consumers’ Attributes = attributes which affect the probability that consumers are attentive. Goods’ Attributes = 
attributes which affect the probability that consumers correctly recall whether or not a given good is offered at a 
discount. The dependent variable is Correct Recall. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*- Significant at 10%. **- Significant at 5%. ***- Significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1. Baseline parameters 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of decreasing the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to consumption,  , from 0.2 to 0.05 
 
 
Note: PA = price attentive, QA = quantity attentive, PQA = price and quantity attentive, IA = inattentive 
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Figure 3. The effect of increasing the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to 
labor,  , from 0.1 to 0.15 
 
 
Figure 4. The effect of decreasing the nominal wage from 1W  to 9.0W  
 
Note: PA = price attentive, QA = quantity attentive, PQA = price and quantity attentive, IA = inattentive 
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Figure 5. The effect of increasing the fraction of the producers who experience cost 
shocks and adjust their goods’ prices, P , from 0.15 to 0.2. 
 
 
Figure 6. The effect of increasing the fraction of producers who experience marginal 
cost shocks and respond by adjusting goods quantity per package Q  from 0.05 to  0.1 
 
Note: PA = price attentive, QA = quantity attentive, PQA = price and quantity attentive, IA = inattentive 
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Figure 7. The effect of increasing the elasticity of substitution,  , from 11 to 21. 
 
 
Figure 8. The effect of increasing the expected marginal cost,  , from 1 to 3 
 
Note: PA = price attentive, QA = quantity attentive, PQA = price and quantity attentive, IA = inattentive 
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Figure 9. The effect of increasing goods’ expected quantity per package from 1 to 1.5 
 
 
Figure 10. The effect of hanging the marginal cost shocks from 15.0,15.0  hl  to 
2.0,2.0  hl   
 
Note: PA = price attentive, QA = quantity attentive, PQA = price and quantity attentive, IA = inattentive 
 
